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As part of the 2017 Audit of UK Democracy, Sean Kippin and the DA team assess the ways in which the UK’s four
main security services are scrutinised, to ensure that they are operating legally and in the public interest. For matters
that must be kept secret, ‘compromise’ forms of scrutiny have now been developed in Parliament. But how
effectively or independently do they work?
GCHQ’s activities have become significantly more complex since the days of code-breaking at Bletchley Park. Photo: John
Keogh via a CC-BY-NC 2.0 licence
What does democracy require for the accountability of security and intelligence
services?
Under normal circumstances, elected legislators normally must control all government services and
state operations, either directly or indirectly (that is, via ministers), normally through full public and
Parliamentary accountability
At the same time, the state must also maintain a national security, intelligence and defence apparatus
sufficient to protect citizens from terrorism and other harms, and to secure national defence – and for much of
such activities maintaining secrecy is essential.
Institutional arrangements must balance these contradictory requirements, ideally securing a degree of
accountability while preserving essential secrecy.
Given limited public accountability, it is of the first importance that legislative, ministerial and judicial controls
are sufficient to ensure that the security and intelligence services respect civil liberties and human rights, and
operate within the law – e.g. with rigorous complaints and investigation processes that engage high levels of
public trust.
In the nature of secret intelligence and espionage matters, there are limits on how far legislative scrutiny can operate
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via the normal parliamentary channels. Every liberal democracy in the world consequently provides some special
machinery of control that is designed to manage the incompatibility between maintaining these vital specials
services and ensuring public accountability.
Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)
This is the main vehicle used in the UK. It is formally a joint committee of the Houses of Parliament. In practice it is
Commons-dominated and is the major way in which MPs in the Westminster Parliament (plus a few peers) exercise
a degree of control over the UK’s intelligence and security services. These consist of
MI5 (internal security),
SIS or MI6 (overseas intelligence),
GCHQ (electronic and other surveillance),
the Defence Intelligence Staffs (military intelligence), and
the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the Cabinet Office, which coordinates and sanctions major
operations, reporting to the Prime Minister.
On the surface, the ISC looks quite like a normal Select Committee of the House of Commons, but when you look
more closely it operates in an almost completely dissimilar way. Its nine members are appointed by the government
in consultation with opposition party leaders (not chosen by vote of other MPs) and they are vetted. The Committee
generally meets in private (although it has held occasional public sessions). It almost always questions security and
intelligence witnesses in private, and issues only heavily vetted summary public reports, designed not to reveal any
secret information. The Chair of the Committee comes from the government party, is appointed by the PM, and is
very influential in settling its workflow and being the public face of its investigations and reports. They (and
committee members) have often (but not always) had a background of supervising security agencies as ministers
(see Chart 1 below).
The ISC is a kind of ‘compromise’ solution of a kind that is quite common in liberal democracies. However, a 2014
report of the Commons’ Home Affairs Committee identified three ‘shortcomings in this approach across many
countries surveyed:
‘the potential for political deference [to ministers and the intelligence services top brass];
the over-identification of the [committee] members with the security and intelligence services: and,
the danger confidential information provided to the committee might be leaked’.
Recent developments
The 2010-15 ISC was criticised as a group of elderly ‘trusties’, all heavily committed to defending intelligence
operations from criticism. Their average age was 63, they were overwhelmingly male in this period, and the ISC
chair was Malcolm Rifkind (aged 67 when he finished, a former foreign and defence secretary), who also had
extensive business interests in a number of related areas.
Serious allegations surfaced in the mid 2000s of UK agencies having colluded with the illegal ‘rendition’ of suspects
by the CIA and US agencies; and of SIS agents knowing of and being complicit in the torturing of suspects by US or
foreign intelligence services. The UK government made large payments to British citizens imprisoned in
Guantanamo Bay and released without any charges (one of whom later died as a jihadist fighter in Syria). Links
between UK services and the Gaddafi regime in Libya have also provoked controversy, and damages have been
paid for a rendition of one person. The Committee investigated all the claims against the UK services in 2007 (in
some fashion, undisclosed) and pronounced that the fears expressed about them were all unfounded.
2/7
In 2013, the scale of surveillance work carried out by Western governments was revealed by Edward Snowden, a
US security contractor, who released a great mass of documents to the Guardian and Washington
Post newspapers. They showed the existence of a series of programmes pertaining to the mining of phone, internet,
and other personal communication data, and agreements to share said data between governments, without – in
most cases – the knowledge or consent of citizen populations. Essentially GCHQ appeared to be running a
‘swapsie’ information deal with the US National Security Agency, whereby GCHQ bulk-spied on US citizens for its
American counterpart (for whom this would be illegal), in exchange for the NSA bulk-spying on British and European
citizens (for which GCHQ would normally need a warrant or ministerial clearance). According to the well-placed
observer Ian Brown the scale and reach of these activities ‘appeared to be a surprise to members of Parliament’s
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), let alone the National Security Council, other parliamentarians, and the
broader public.’ Under Rifkind’s lead, the Intelligence and Security Committee rather promptly cleared GCHQ of any
wrongdoing at all, which a former Chair of the ISC and Conservative Defence Secretary Lord King described as
‘unfortunate’ and ‘pretty quick’.
In February 2015 Rifkind was involved in a press ‘sting’ operation (along with former Labour foreign secretary, Jack
Straw), where Daily Telegraph journalists claimed both men offered to trade lobbying influence for advisor fees.
Cleared by a limited Commons investigation, both men’s public credibility was none the less impaired. In September
2015 Rifkind stood down as ISC Chair.
The post-2015 ICS
The new ISC Chair appointed in 2015 was the Conservative MP Dominic Grieve, a former Solicitor General
(government law officer), who has been a prominent defender of the European Convention on Human Rights and
someone with a strong civil liberties reputation. He has attracted press coverage over recent years for his stances
on issues such as enforced removal of UK passports from citizens, the stalled Gibson Inquiry which looked into the
treatment of detainees, and the potential implications of repealing the Human Rights Act. Since Grieve’s
appointment in September 2015, the ISC has produced two reports.
The most dramatic report was on drone strikes in Syria in which civilians were killed, at least three of whom were
British citizens. David Cameron explained in 2015 that the deaths were the first time a UK drone had been used to
kill someone in a country with which Britain was not at war. The report was rushed out in April 2017, with substantial
redactions that the ISC had no time to challenge before the General Election. In it, the Committee expressed
frustration that the Government had deemed the strikes a military issue and therefore outside the ISC’s remit:
“Oversight and scrutiny depend on primary evidence: without sight of the actual documents provided
to Ministers we cannot ourselves be sure – nor offer an assurance to Parliament or the public – that
we have indeed been given the full facts surrounding the authorisation process for the lethal strike
against [one citizen] Reyaad Khan.”
The other ISC report covered the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA), also known as the ‘snoopers’ charter’ which the
Conservative government argued was urgently needed. The Committee was sceptical of the need for bulk hacking
powers and said that the bill should include privacy protections. The Act was slightly modified to allay these
concerns, with a clause inserted to the effect that mass surveillance powers were not to be used if less intrusive
means were available. The civil liberties group ‘Liberty’ continues to call for a judicial review of the wide-reaching
bulk surveillance powers available to government departments and the security services under the IPA.
Demand for further reform of the ISC remains on the agenda. Only two of nine ISC members are women, and both
stood down at the 2017 General Election. Lord MacDonald, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, has argued
that the Committee ought to become a select committee like any other, and criticised the ‘partial’ nature of the
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reforms enacted by the 2013 Justice and Security Act. He argued that the reforms
‘unwittingly or not, actually weakened democratic oversight of the security and intelligence agencies
through the introduction of closed hearings into our civil justice system in national security cases,
while simultaneously failing to strengthen the structures of direct parliamentary oversight in any
meaningful way.’
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Strengths Weaknesses
The ISC follows the pattern of
a common, minimum or
compromise solution used in
several liberal democracies.
It creates some appearance
of an independent Commons
capacity to investigate, that is
separate from ministers.
For the first time, the heads of
the security services were
questioned in front of the ISC
in public, and the Director of
MI5 has in addition been
interviewed on the Today
Programme, suggesting a
new willingness to engage
with the public via the media.
ISC members are able to
require the security agencies
to produce information
pertaining to their activities, a
stronger power than is
granted to standard Select
Committees which only have
the power to ‘request’
departmental information.
Under Dominic Grieve’s
chairmanship, the ISC has
shown a willingness to defend
privacy concerns in the face
of bulk surveillance.
The Committee has also
reported on UK drone strikes,
although its report was
heavily redacted.
 
The Committee has a modest staff, no investigatory powers and
can only conduct very limited private hearings with the heads of
agencies.
The ISC is in principle able to consider any operational matter, but
only if it is a matter of significant national interest and does not form
part of an ongoing operation. Since security operations often take
place over a long period, this is a significant restriction.
Despite the ability to request information from the security services
and other governmental bodies engaged in intelligence work,
sensitive material is subject to veto at Secretary of State level on
grounds that are not limited to national security.
Inherently the Committee is not normally able to publish much of the
evidence that it has taken, but can only pronounce its conclusions.
The ISC remains to a considerable degree in hoc to the
government, with the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition
nominating ISC members. Additionally, the Prime Minister continues
to receive ISC reports ahead of publication, and retains the right to
choose the timing of publication, and even to veto the publication of
certain elements of the report. (This scrutiny power is probably
mostly delegated to the Permanent Secretary who chairs the
Cabinet Office’s Joint Intelligence Committee).
The committee has no legal obligation to investigate and make
public the kinds of intelligence service work which may create
controversy due to invasion of civil liberties or human rights. Nor
does it have any duty to educate or to explain the intricacies of
intelligence work to both parliamentarians and members of the
public.
The ISC remains a one-off and heavily ‘siloed’ body with little
transfer of knowledge or expertise from a core group of
representatives to the wider Parliament.
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Opportunities for positive change Future Threats
The new ICS Chair (Grieve) has a good reputation
for taking rights issues seriously, and legal
knowledge.
The Justice and Security Act (2013) ended the
anomalous situation by which the secretariat to a
Parliamentary Committee was provided by
Cabinet Office civil servants (itself a government
department with intelligence responsibilities). So
the ISC now has its own, dedicated staff – which
may help it to take a more independent attitude
over time.
With the growth of violent extremism, and other
threats, externally, and the increasing scale of
homeland security interventions, the absence
of more credible Parliamentary safeguards for
UK citizens may fuel problems.
The provisions of the RIPA 2000 (Regulatory
and Investigatory Powers Act) are being greatly
extended by current legislation – giving
security services greater powers to hoover up
the electronic communications of all citizens
without warrants. ISC has no apparent
resources for effectively monitoring the use of
such powers.
If the Government deems an issue a military
one then it falls outside the ISC’s remit.
Changing methods of warfare make this an
increasingly likely occurrence.
Chairs of the Intelligence and Security Committee
This key role has tended to be given to former ministers, with preponderance towards those who have served in
governmental positions in which security clearance is required. Table 1 below shows that only Ann Taylor and the
Dominic Grieve had served in ministerial positions that did not pertain to security matters prior to their appointment
(and even then both were Cabinet members).
Table 1: Chairs of the Joint Intelligence and Security Committee since its creation in 1994
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*Position involves supervising security services
Reporting by the Committee
The Intelligence and Security Committee is now required to release an annual report on ‘the discharge of its
functions’ and 2013 legislation ‘enables it to make any other reports as it considers appropriate concerning any
aspects of its functions’. This differs from the situation before the 2013 Act was implemented, which required the ISC
to make its reports to the Prime Minister alone. However, the Prime Minister still enjoys foresight of reports and can
delay their publication or veto the release of certain information.
The committee may also make other reports on issues and topics which it views as important. For example, in
November 2014, it produced a report on the London murder of an off-duty soldier Lee Rigby in a London street. It
also released a report entitled ‘Women in the Intelligence Community‘ in March 2015. The same month, it published
‘Privacy and Security: a modern and transparent legal framework‘ showing the range and frequency of ISC reports.
After Donald Trump claimed that President Barack Obama had asked the UK to wiretap him while he was candidate
for the presidency, Dominic Grieve said in a statement that it was ‘inconceivable’ that GCHQ could have done so.
Political neutrality, transparency and openness
Before 1994 the UK’s official attitude to the security services was not to even acknowledge their existence. A more
open approach has also now lead some of the main UK security agencies recently to engage more actively in public
debate, partly because they use public appearances to lobby for increased surveillance powers in battling terrorism,
cyberattacks and major crime. The Director of MI5 Andrew Parker agreed to be interviewed by the
BBC’s Today programme in September 2015 – but then did not reveal anything by way of new information. Instead
Parker used the interview to justify the passage of the draft Investigatory Powers Act. Robert Harrington, the
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normally reclusive head of GCHQ, wrote an opinion piece for the Financial Times in which he made the case for a
new understanding between the security services, social media companies, and the public.
The first ever evidence session at which ISC members publicly questioned the agency heads was held in late 2013.
An academic expert on the ISC, Andrew Defty, noted that:
‘Some of the questions were clearly designed to allow the agency heads to make prepared
statements dispelling popular myths about their work. It is hardly tenable, for example, that [the then-
ISC Chair] Sir Malcolm Rifkind really believes that GCHQ collects information on “the majority of the
public”. But his suggestion that they did, allowed the head of GCHQ to refute the notion’.
Conclusion
The Intelligence and Select Committee remains an imperfect and very limited body for the regulation of the large,
powerful, and secretive intelligence services. Despite recent reforms which have seen the body become a
committee of Parliament, and influence over its membership extended to Parliament, it is still a body over which the
government and Prime Minister exercise an enormous amount of influence. Choreographed evidence sessions
between the committee and the Service heads suggest an over-co-operative, too close relationship. So too does the
past willingness of the committee to very promptly exonerate the GCHQ in regard to the Snowden revelations and
the charges of data collection and surveillance exceeding the agency’s remit – a clearance that occurred while the
revelations were still emerging. Although the ICS criticised the lack of privacy safeguards in the Investigatory Powers
Bill, it did not secure major changes in the final Act.
This post does not represent the views of the London School of Economics.
Sean Kippin is a PhD candidate and Associate Lecturer at the University of the West of Scotland and a former editor
of Democratic Audit.
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